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Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits for
Web Server Defense





1. Conceptual: autonomic web server defense as reinforcement learning task
2. Algorithmical: new algorithm CMABFAS (contextual multi-armed bandits for finite action spaces)
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The Application
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We’ve all seen this before ...
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Example
Case study: deteting and preventing HTTP-based attaks on web servers
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Example
Case study: deteting and preventing HTTP-based attaks on web servers
Question: how an we do this?
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Answer: Reinforcement learning (RL)
Benets:
does not require human experts to write/update rules
does not require orretly labeled training data
allows the system to beome self-learning
allows the system to defend against novel attaks
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Learning Algorithm:
CMABFAS
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Notation
X ontext spae
a ∈ {1, . . . , k} possible ations for x ∈ X
Ra(x) reward distribution for situation x and ation a
bounded support: supp Ra(x) ⊆ [0, 1]
ra(x) samples drawn from Ra(x)
µa(x) mean of the reward distribution Ra(x)
Goal: when presented with any x ∈ X , we want to hoose the ation with the highest expeted
reward
given x, return argmax
a
µa(x)
The ath: Ra(x) and µa(x) is not known!!!
Solution: estimate µa(x) from samples => exploration vs. exploitation
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MAB vs contextual MAB
So far, this looks a lot like a traditional k-armed bandit.
The main dierene is: in k-armed bandits the reward does not depend on x.
Learning in ontextual MAB is signiantly more diult sine we have to aggregate
samples over X . These samples are no longer iid samples (dierent base distributions).
In order to make learning possible, we need to make some additional strutural assumptions:
The expeted reward is smooth over X
Formally: let X be equipped with pseudo-metri d(x, x′) (with supx,x′ d(x, x
′) = 1). We
then assume that eah µa(·) is Lipshitz:
|µa(x)− µa(x′)| ≤ λ · d(x, x′) ∀x, x′ ∈ X ,∀a









ation 1ation 1 ation 2ation 2
optimaloptimaloptimaloptimal
=samples r1(·) ∼ R1(·)
=samples r2(·) ∼ R2(·)
xt =?
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CMABFAS–Overview
For eah ation a separately, we inrementally onstrut over time t = 1, 2, . . . a over of
X .
The over onsists of ball-shaped regions where individual balls are entered on some of the
{x1, . . . , xt−1} seen so far.




, . . ..
Eah ball aggregates the reward samples lying within.
Eah ball overing xt an be used to upper-bound µa(xt) and produes a sore whih
onsists of
1. sample average within the ball (exploitation)
2. how many samples are in the ball (exploration)
3. how large is the ball (exploration)
The best ball for eah ation is then the one with the lowest sore (tightest upper bound).
The best ation overall is the highest suh sore.
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CMABFAS–Overview 2
Adaptive renement: New balls are reated aording to the following rules:
A new ball is reated entered at (xt, at) at 1/2 radius of the parent (where at is the
ation hosen at time t).
A new ball an only be reated if the number of samples in the parent ball exeeds a ertain
threshold (i.e., the ball is full).
A new ball is only reated if it will not overlap with already existing balls at the same level
of the hierarhy.
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CMABFAS–Algorithm
For t = 1, 2, . . .
Get ontext xt.
For eah ation a = 1 . . . k
Determine set of ative balls Aa(xt)
(=balls whih over xt)
Determine set of relevant balls Ra(xt)
(=ative balls whih are either not full, or are full and an produe a hild)
Determine sore

















Perform best ation at := argmaxa∈1,...,k u(xt, a)
Observe reward rt ∼ Rat(xt) and update ounters.
Adaptive renement: Add new ball at (xt, at) with 1/2 radius if winning ball is full
(and thus allows a hild to be reated)
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CMABFAS–Properties
Analysis: CMABFAS works beause
the sore u(xt, a) is a high-probability bound for µa(xt) (Azuma-Hoeding for martingales
with bounded inrements)
the radius of the "winning" ball at step t an thus be used to upper-bound the loss at step
t (smaller balls, better auray)
the adaptive renement rules ensure that the balls get smaller, but only in those regions of
X where the orresponding ation is optimal.
the number of times large balls are "winning" balls an be upper-bound by the r-paking
number of X (and the near optimality dimension of the problem, see [Slivkins, 2009;
Bubek et al. 2008; Munos 2011℄) =⇒ regret bounds!
Implementation: From a pratial point of view CMABFAS has two nie properties:
it is a heap algorithm with little omputational ost and low storage requirements
it is an anytime algorithm
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Experiments
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Web server defense scenario
Our urrent modeling of the web server defense senario as ontextual MAB looks like this:
X attributes extrated from the initial HTTP request of a session
(essentially a vetor of text strings)
d(x, x′) omparing two text strings (for details see paper)
a {ation #1,ation #2, ation #3}
- ation #1: apply no seurity measure
- ation #2: apply seurity measure Type-1 (abstrat ation)
- ation #3: apply seurity measure Type-2 (abstrat ation)
r(x, a)
- eah HTTP session was manually labeled and assigned to one of 9 lasses
- eah lass was manually assigned a reward prole (Bernoulli distribution)
- WIP: originally we envisioned an automated proedure to internally generate rewards
Note: Unlike in lassiation or anomaly detetion, we annot work with training data to verify our
approah. Due to the interative nature the system hoosing ations must be able to observe how
the environments responds. This is very diult to simulate.
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Experimental protocol
Data: obtained from a real, loally hosted web server
57,389 HTTP requests grouped into 1126 sessions (logged between Jan-De 2011)
mostly regular tra, but also
sans for vulnerable versions of installed pakages
remote ode injetion attempts
spam on publi wiki
Experiment:
Eah of the sessions was semi-automatially assigned to a lass/reward prole
For t = 1 . . . 1, 000, 000, draw random session xt from orpus and present it to the
CMABFAS defense system
Contestant: ompare against a naive baseline method whih
inrementally but non-adaptively lusters X
assigns eah inoming xt to the nearest luster
uses a traditional k-armed bandit to handle eah luster separately (UCB-1.2).
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Results






















CMABFAS: ∼ 450 mistakes (out of 1,000,000 possible ones)
Best naive MAB: ∼ 3200 mistakes (out of 1,000,000 possible ones)




Arhiteture for a self-learning web server defense via RL
2. Algorithmial:
CMABFAS (a new algorithm for ontextual MAB)
Note: All of this is ongoing work. Experiments so far were merely "simulated".
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